Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'How the Laws of Physics Lie', 'Humean metaphysics vs metaphysics of Powers' and 'Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study''

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26 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
10631 If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
10624 The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10629 If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
10628 The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
10622 The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
16185 Causality indicates which properties are real [Cartwright,N]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
10626 Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
16182 Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework [Cartwright,N]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
16184 An explanation is a model that fits a theory and predicts the phenomenological laws [Cartwright,N]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16167 Laws get the facts wrong, and explanation rests on improvements and qualifications of laws [Cartwright,N]
16169 Laws apply to separate domains, but real explanations apply to intersecting domains [Cartwright,N]
16171 The covering law view assumes that each phenomenon has a 'right' explanation [Cartwright,N]
16176 Covering-law explanation lets us explain storms by falling barometers [Cartwright,N]
16177 I disagree with the covering-law view that there is a law to cover every single case [Cartwright,N]
16180 You can't explain one quail's behaviour by just saying that all quails do it [Cartwright,N]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
16183 In science, best explanations have regularly turned out to be false [Cartwright,N]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10630 Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
10627 Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
16175 A cause won't increase the effect frequency if other causes keep interfering [Cartwright,N]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
6781 There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities) [Cartwright,N, by Bird]
16166 Laws of appearances are 'phenomenological'; laws of reality are 'theoretical' [Cartwright,N]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
16179 Good organisation may not be true, and the truth may not organise very much [Cartwright,N]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
16178 There are few laws for when one theory meets another [Cartwright,N]
16170 To get from facts to equations, we need a prepared descriptions suited to mathematics [Cartwright,N]
16181 Simple laws have quite different outcomes when they act in combinations [Cartwright,N]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
13440 Causation is the power of one property to produce another, and this gives time its direction [Esfeld]